Threat Signal Report
BotenaGo Malware Targets Multiple IoT Devices
FortiGuard Labs is aware of a report that source code of BotenaGo malware was recently made available on GitHub. BotenaGo is a malware written in Golang and is reportedly capable of exploiting more than 30 vulnerabilities in various IoT devices such as routers, modems, and NAS devices, and varies the delivered payload depending on the device it successfully exploited.
Why is this Significant?
This is significant because the source code of BotenaGo malware is available on a publicly available repository and with the report that BotenaGo is capable of exploiting more than 30 vulnerabilities, an uptick of its activities is expected.
What is BotenaGo Malware?
BotenaGo is an IoT (Internet fo Things) malware written in Golang and may become a new arsenal used by Mirai attackers.
The malware is reportedly capable of exploiting more than 30 vulnerabilities in various IoT devices (a list of those vulnerabilities is contained in the Alien Labs blog linked in the Appendix). After the targeted device is successfully exploited, the malware executes remote shell commands that download a payload that varies depending on the device it successfully compromised. BotenaGo also sets up a backdoor on the compromised machine and awaits remote commands from the attacker on ports 19412 and 31412. It can also set a listener to system IO (terminal) user input and get remote commands through it.
What Vulnerabilities are Exploited by BotenaGo?
Some of the known vulnerabilities exploited by BotenaGo are below:
- CVE-2013-3307: Linksys X3000 1.0.03 build 001
- CVE-2013-5223: D-Link DSL-2760U Gateway (Rev. E1)
- CVE-2014-2321: ZTE modems
- CVE-2015-2051: D-Link routers
- CVE-2016-11021: D-Link routers
- CVE-2016-1555: Netgear devices
- CVE-2016-6277: Netgear devices
- CVE-2017-18362: ConnectWise plugin
- CVE-2017-18368: Zyxel routers and NAS devices
- CVE-2017-6077: Netgear devices
- CVE-2017-6334: Netgear devices
- CVE-2018-10088: XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0
- CVE-2018-10561: Dasan GPON home routers
- CVE-2018-10562: Dasan GPON home routers
- CVE-2019-19824: Realtek SDK based routers
- CVE-2020-10173: VR-3033 router
- CVE-2020-10987: Tenda products
- CVE-2020-8515: Vigor routers
- CVE-2020-8958: Guangzhou 1 GE ONU
- CVE-2020-9054: Zyxel routers and NAS devices
- CVE-2020-9377: D-Link routers
What is the Status of Coverage?
FortiGuard Labs provide the following AV coverage against available BotenaGo malware samples:
FortiGuard Labs provides the following IPS coverage against exploit attempts made by BotenaGo:
- ZTE.Router.Web_shell_cmd.Remote.Command.Execution (CVE-2014-2321)
- D-Link.Devices.HNAP.SOAPAction-Header.Command.Execution (CVE-2015-2051)
- Netgear.macAddress.Remote.Command.Execution (CVE-2016-1555)
- NETGEAR.WebServer.Module.Command.Injection (CVE-2016-6277)
- TrueOnline.ZyXEL.P660HN.V1.Unauthenticated.Command.Injection (CVE-2017-18368)
- NETGEAR.ping_IPAddr.HTTP.Post.Command.Injection (CVE-2017-6077)
- NETGEAR.DGN.DnsLookUp.Remote.Command.Injection (CVE-2017-6334)
- XiongMai.uc-httpd.Buffer.Overflow (CVE-2018-10088)
- Dasan.GPON.Remote.Code.Execution (CVE-2018-10561, Dasan.GPON.Remote.Code.Execution)
- Comtrend.VR-3033.Remote.Command.Injection (CVE-2020-10173)
- Tenda.AC15.AC1900.Authenticated.Remote.Command.Injection (CVE-2020-10987)
- DrayTek.Vigor.Router.Web.Management.Page.Command.Injection (CVE-2020-8515)
- ZyXEL.NAS.Pre-authentication.OS.Command.Injection (CVE-2020-9054)
All network IOCs are blocked by the WebFiltering client.
FortiGuard Labs is currently investigating for additional coverage. This Threat Signal will be updated when new protection becomes available.
Traffic Light Protocol
|Color||When Should it Be used?||How may it be shared?|
TLP: REDNot for disclosure, restricted to participants only.
|Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.||Recipients may not share TLP:RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it was originally disclosed. In the context of a meeting, for example, TLP:RED information is limited to those present at the meeting. In most circumstances, TLP:RED should be exchanged verbally or in person.|
TLP: AMBERLimited disclosure, restricted to participants’ organizations.
|Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, yet carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.||Recipients may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm. Sources are at liberty to specify additional intended limits of the sharing: these must be adhered to.|
TLP: GREENLimited disclosure, restricted to the community.
|Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.||Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels. Information in this category can be circulated widely within a particular community. TLP:GREEN information may not be released outside of the community.|
TLP: WHITEDisclosure is not limited.
|Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.||Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.|