Guloader Spam Indiscriminately Sent to State Elections Board

Description

Recently, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint public service announcement - Foreign Actors Likely to Use Information Manipulation Tactics for 2022 Midterm Elections (9I-100622-PSA). The focus of the PSA was to inform the public of the potential manipulation of the midterm election cycle in the United States by foreign agents using social engineering and social media disinformation tactics to influence voters and to sow discord as well.

Around the same time of the announcement, FortiGuard Labs observed a Guloader campaign being sent to an elections body in the United States. Although there is no sign that they were specifically targeted, we want to highlight what's involved in these attacks given the 2022 U.S. midterm elections in November. The infection vectors are simple malicious spam that do not rely on exploiting a vulnerability or macros.

FortiGuard Labs found a campaign from a purported industrial equipment manufacturer in Indonesia, containing a malicious ISO attachment.

Figure 1. Email used in this spam campaign

ISO email attachments are often used to avoid detection by security solutions. Clicking on the attachment triggers the ISO file. Once mounted, an EXE file-a GuLoader malware variant-becomes visible. The victim then needs to run the "Requisition order-PT. LFC Teknologi,pdf.exe" executable manually to start the infection routine.

Figure 2. GuLoader file in the mounted ISO file

This file is digitally signed via an untrusted root certificate, seen below.

Figure 3. Digital signature information for "Requisition order-PT. LFC Teknologi,pdf.exe".

The GuLoader payload is a so-called first stage malware that has been seen in the wild for the past few years. It is designed to deliver a second stage payload that can be tailored to the attacker's liking. Some reported second stage payloads include Remote Access Trojans (RATs), infostealers, and ransomware.

This particular GuLoader variant reaches out to 195[.]178[.]120[.]184/sMHxAbMCsvl181[.]java, which was no longer available at the time of the investigation. However, we believe the java file to either be a decryption key or a payload download. Another, GuLoader sample (SHA2: 46f8a8cec6bb92708a185cfea876ea1ae0cdef2321dc50f140f23c7cc650b65e) was submitted to VirusTotal on September 14th. This sample accesses 195[.]178[.]120[.]184/uFLBwGvx55[.]java and available OSINT suggests that the payload is the Azorult infostealer.

Azorult is capable of exfiltrating data such as passwords from browsers, email, and FTP servers, and harvesting files with extensions specified by an attacker. It can also collect machine information such as user and computer name, installed programs, Windows version, and installed programs. Such stolen information can be a precursor to future attacks.

Based on the traits of the GuLoader sample, FortiGuard Labs tracked down additional files involved in the same malicious spam campaign. The attacker mostly used IMG and ISO attachments along with file names in English, German, Spanish, Turkish, and Chinese. Taking a look at VirusTotal, submissions of the attachments are from the US, Czechia, China, Turkey, Germany, UK, Israel, Ireland, and Hungary. The GuLoader variant was also submitted to VirusTotal from the US, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the United Arab Emirates, and Korea.

The email delivered to a board of elections in the United States was sent to a publicly available webmaster address. This indicates that the attacker sent these malicious emails to as many recipients as possible in the hope that someone would manually execute the malware. This is the first step to a potential compromise of machines related to the elections board of this United States state, and will allow the attacker to obtain a foothold to obtain unauthorized data for dissemination or simply various angles of disruption (ransomware, wiping, extortion, etc.) and even worse, perhaps sell access to an adversary for financial gain.

Fortinet Protections

Fortinet customers are already protected from the malware identified in this report through FortiGuard's Web Filtering, AntiVirus, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR services, as follows:

The following (AV) signatures detect the malware samples mentioned in this blog

• NSIS/Injector.AOW!tr

• W32/BHQ!tr

• W32/BHQ.YXCIMZ!tr

• W32/Qbot.G!tr

• JS/Agent.BLOB!tr.dldr

• LNK/Agent.RD!tr

• JS/Starter.3A1B!tr

• BAT/Starter.NIU!tr

The WebFiltering client blocks all network-based URIs.

Fortinet also has multiple solutions designed to help train users to understand and detect phishing threats:

The FortiPhish Phishing Simulation Service uses real-world simulations to help organizations test user awareness and vigilance to phishing threats and to train and reinforce proper practices when users encounter targeted phishing attacks.

We also suggest that organizations have their end users undergo our FREE NSE training program: NSE 1 - Information Security Awareness. It includes a module on Internet threats designed to help end users learn how to identify and protect themselves from various types of phishing attacks.

IOCs

File IOCs (SHA2)

GuLoader variants distributed in this spam campaign

• 162970957d591f4652c635a18a7f11bb2f06de08f263f9d467e6fe0c4d6aa00f

• 21d01928ac971c2a228a2d9e7e188aa4a07783924b84e66af618e3155eb282eb

• 28712de9f03560d66c60812052b514c6a78d41287a03fb3cfdd066741ebc81dc

• 46f8a8cec6bb92708a185cfea876ea1ae0cdef2321dc50f140f23c7cc650b65e

• 70856a79551c2e921db13eb757834a8bcb4a808ad5414e00ba207f7f132cc69f

• 71186a72ce8b23242674c50e305fe2a1b98605d434d4af6f4190c9bb696e2388

• 74c91f5ce079fcfdf8ec9813ec3e37c63a46e0d397b8ec31c89ca6bf17fe9229

• 857364a9a903444a86b2f8d129c00bb5727beabcee4c1a8103b561ead678956f

• 9ac2c9bce0561cb760098b252f3096cf1222e35bfdc1d380b1dc654dd81ed641

• 9e147e27260eafbc680958cd72cf32143a426d245c29b09efdd78746752e6471

• 9f245c6d31b3e8b7389053d954121927093a592b08bc02f3bac2516e78aa5808

• aeca53c38a1bc40b7a53d5fcf7adceda97ac54ac56af1f161763c622c8e70d4f

• b531a9e5b9ba3e10ec2ac3428e0a9835b9468943580df0894483ee9a91377294

• b990b2e60ff7d5cbb74d1e42c87b08c722cc1db380608b58f2c8d4e51e8a1402

• bb374bed2c79ac878b6626a1537f6f7869ab6176fba4e0f5cb16f11a255a285b

• cf7188027fdf9e58695083342a2217ab861354ce960b324f4f59cbd350569a6c

• d3d3a37db592226da6dcece19a2344e8a942b197001078fbdb518f262287e48f

• ddf7d6b4d3b9677c5801cf1a7889c7396cce76752c593417b381e5abaf4bd1a5

• e8ba90c9d071f49c4c8761ce1fcdd44f1d672c891a8625a1b2352a047bfd2b42

• e929eddc1a4fa72a448d92b73ec8a4d4497bf8b1f937606f69a6ff831a66b45e

Email attachments (IMG and ISO) used to distribute GuLoader in this spam campaign

• 162970957d591f4652c635a18a7f11bb2f06de08f263f9d467e6fe0c4d6aa00f

• 21d01928ac971c2a228a2d9e7e188aa4a07783924b84e66af618e3155eb282eb

• 28712de9f03560d66c60812052b514c6a78d41287a03fb3cfdd066741ebc81dc

• 46f8a8cec6bb92708a185cfea876ea1ae0cdef2321dc50f140f23c7cc650b65e

• 70856a79551c2e921db13eb757834a8bcb4a808ad5414e00ba207f7f132cc69f

• 71186a72ce8b23242674c50e305fe2a1b98605d434d4af6f4190c9bb696e2388

• 74c91f5ce079fcfdf8ec9813ec3e37c63a46e0d397b8ec31c89ca6bf17fe9229

• 857364a9a903444a86b2f8d129c00bb5727beabcee4c1a8103b561ead678956f

• 9ac2c9bce0561cb760098b252f3096cf1222e35bfdc1d380b1dc654dd81ed641

• 9e147e27260eafbc680958cd72cf32143a426d245c29b09efdd78746752e6471

• 9f245c6d31b3e8b7389053d954121927093a592b08bc02f3bac2516e78aa5808

• b531a9e5b9ba3e10ec2ac3428e0a9835b9468943580df0894483ee9a91377294

• b990b2e60ff7d5cbb74d1e42c87b08c722cc1db380608b58f2c8d4e51e8a1402

• bb374bed2c79ac878b6626a1537f6f7869ab6176fba4e0f5cb16f11a255a285b

• cf7188027fdf9e58695083342a2217ab861354ce960b324f4f59cbd350569a6c

• d3d3a37db592226da6dcece19a2344e8a942b197001078fbdb518f262287e48f

• ddf7d6b4d3b9677c5801cf1a7889c7396cce76752c593417b381e5abaf4bd1a5

• e8ba90c9d071f49c4c8761ce1fcdd44f1d672c891a8625a1b2352a047bfd2b42

• e929eddc1a4fa72a448d92b73ec8a4d4497bf8b1f937606f69a6ff831a66b45e

Network IOCs related to the GuLoader spam campaign

• gwinaz[.]pro/PL341/index.php

• kngpdrp[.]shop/PL341/index.php

• chino[.]shop/PL341/index.php

• www.funeralprogramsshop[.]com/e65x/

Appendix

Foreign Actors Likely to Use Information Manipulation Tactics for 2022 Midterm Elections (CISA)