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Papers And Presentations

Reducing the Window of Opportunity for A...

References

(
EICAR 2012
)

Abstract

This paper is all about finding new Android malware in the wild (crawling Google Play but also spotting suspicious applications among loads of genuine apps using a heuristic engine). Was presented at EICAR 2012.
An Attacker’s Day into Human Virology

References

(
BlackHat Europe 2012
)

Abstract

Computer virology bares such a strong resemblance with Human virology that both worlds have often been compared humorously. In this presentation, we wish to push the comparison further down into the details of implementation and attack strategies. Have you ever wondered how much those nasty biological viruses actually invented before Black Hats did? They surely invented brute-force attacks, polymorphism and time bombs, and yet, they never presented at BlackHat for this! We intend to give them credit for some of their best attack scenarios. For instance, Influenza, who intentionally omits a replication error checking protein to have copies randomly mutate, is a potential nominee. On the other hand, there are few techniques we can only be grateful biology has not picked up yet, and dearly hope viruses won't ever evolve from BlackHat attendees genomes. Indeed, what would happen to us if chicken pox, measles, or rotavirus played cat and mice with medical doctors and continuously learned to detect test tubes (virtual machines) and microscopes (reverse engineering tools)? Finally, considering the advances of cybernetics, we contemplate the possibilities of actually witnessing a convergence between human and computer viruses in a more or less distant future.
Android Reverse Engineering Tools

References

(

InsomniHack'12

)

Abstract

Android Reverse Engineering Tools, from an anti-virus analyst's perspective. Presents known reversing tools: apktool, baksmali, dex2jar, androguard, ded, dedexer... Tutorial on reversing of Android/Spitmo.C!tr.spy Android emulator tricks
Defeating mTANs for profit

References

()

Abstract

Malware on mobile phones has existed for several years, but until recently it had not been used for organized crime involving large amounts of money. This changed in September 2010 when the infamous Zeus gang, known for targeting online banking, started to show a clear interest in infecting mobile phones and released a new version of their bot to propagate a trojan for mobile phones. In this two-part article we will present an in-depth reverse engineering of the mobile phone trojan, show how to reroute stolen SMS messages to a test phone, and explain how to display hidden windows of the trojan.
An OpenBTS GSM Replication Jail for Mobi...

References

(Virus Bulletin 2011)

Abstract

There is one golden rule in the Anti-Virus industry all AV analysts are very cautious about: making sure they do not spread samples which are under study. On PCs, vendors commonly use replication hosts in a very restricted environment (Virtual Machines, firewalls, limited network connection etc). The task is unfortunately more complicated on mobile phones, because less tools are available and because nearly all viruses assume they have either GSM or Internet connection to operate correctly. We have consequently built a fake GSM operator using the Open Source OpenBTS project to help us analyze mobile malware live while being sure they are not inadvertently propagated on the network of a real operator. This paper explains how we set up our GSM network and then how to use it for analysis of mobile malware. Using recent mobile malware samples, we show how to trace calls or sniff SMS messages. We also enhance this GSM network with a firewalled wifi and explain how to deal with more advanced mobile malware which communicate with remote hosts on Internet. Finally, we conclude with current limitations and future work concerning this replication architecture.
Cryptography for mobile malware obfuscat...

References

(RSA Conference Europe, October 2011)

Abstract

Malware for mobile phones are perhaps less known than Windows viruses, but they are nevertheless a fact now, confirmed by the recent trojans on Android (Geinimi, DrdDream). In this session, we address the use of cryptography in mobile malware. How smart are they? In particular, we reverse engineer recent malware, show which cryptographic algorithms they use and how to decrypt malicious payload.
Mobile Malware..In Practice

References

(Insomni'Hack 2011)

Abstract

Recent examples of malware for mobile phones, what they do, how they do it and frequent symptoms
Understanding and Exploiting Flash Actio...

References

(CanSecWest 2011)

Abstract

Understanding and Exploiting Flash ActionScript Vulnerabilities

Adobe's Flash Player has become the most popular rich internet application (RIA) today. Recent years we have seen many Flash zero-day attacks in the wild, and researchers' analysis show that the black-hat hackers found these vulnerabilities just by 'dumb fuzzing' [1]. On the other hand, one year ago, Dion Blazakis did a fantastic effort which opened the door leveraging Flash JIT mechanism for universal ASLR+DEP bypassing exploitation (JIT Spray) [2]. Unfortunately, current Flash Players implemented several improvements including randomizing the start address of JITed function, which increased the difficulty of JIT Spraying exploitation significantly.

But what is the essence of Flash ActionScript-level vulnerabilities? Furthermore, how to write modern exploits for them? This work goes deep into the ActionScript's Virtual Machine 2 (AVM2) and Just-In-Time (JIT) implementation trying to answer these two questions.

We use the recent Flash zero-day CVE-2010-3654 as a case study to understand the JIT compiler behavior and internal atom (and object) structures. A new JIT-specific vulnerability class called 'Atom Confusion' will be exposed, then, we will introduce a novel technology which is used to 'read' arbitrary memories when Atom Confusion happens. As a proof, a perfect ASLR+DEP bypassing exploit for CVE-2010-3654 which does not rely on non-ASLR module or heap/JIT spray can be developed out successfully.

[1] http://blog.fortinet.com/fuzz-my-life-flash-player-zero-day-vulnerabilit...
[2] http://www.semantiscope.com/research/BHDC2010/BHDC-2010-Paper.pdf
Defeating mTANs for profit

References

(ShmooCon 2011)

Abstract

Nowadays, many banks try to secure their online transactions by sending an additional one-time password by SMS (mTAN) to the end-user. Unfortunately, in September 2010, the infamous ZeuS gang has written a new version, named Zitmo, which defeats this method. Mainly, Zitmo consists in infecting the end-user's mobile phone with a trojan that intercepts SMS on the phone. The whole operation is difficult to spot even to security-aware specialists.

This presentation explains how the attacks works, from one end to the other. We focus in particular on the mobile phone trojan's routines that intercept, process, send or release SMS messages. The analysis is conducted side by side with ARM assembly code. We show how to reroute stolen SMS messages to a test phone or how to display hidden windows of the trojan.

Rearing its Seven Ugly Heads: The DLL-Pr...

References

None

Abstract

None
Symbian Worm Yxes: Towards Mobile Botnet...

References

(EICAR 2010)

Abstract

In 2009, a new Symbian malware named SymbOS/Yxes was detected and quickly hit the headlines as one of the first malware for Symbian OS 9 and above all as the foretaste of a mobile botnet. Yet, the detailed analysis of the malware was still missing. This paper addresses this issue and details how the malware silently connects to the Internet, installs new malware or spreads to other victims. Each of these points is illustrated with commented assembly code taken from the malware or re-generated Symbian API calls. Besides those implementation aspects, the paper also provides a global overview of Yxes's behaviour. It explains how malicious remote servers participate in the configuration and propagation of the malware, including Yxes's similarities with a botnet. It also tries to shed light on some incomplete or misleading statements in prior press articles. Those statements are corrected, based on the reverse engineering evidence previously. Finally, the paper concludes on Yxes's importance and the lack of security on mobile phones. It also indicates several aspects future work should focus on such as communication decryption, tools to analyze embedded malware or cybercriminals motivations.

Four Malware and a Funeral

References

(SAR-SSI 2010)

Abstract

This paper selects four malware targeting mobile phone platforms, namely Eeki, Yxes, Redoc and GameSat. They are currently among the most relevant malware in terms of prevalence, or because they are precursors of their kinds. A technical description is provided for each: how it infects the phone, its malicious payload and propagation mechanism. The descriptions in this paper are mostly new. The paper concludes on two common trends: the simplicity of such malware - only little skills are required to implement them - and their monetization. There are so many mobile phone users that malware authors have the opportunity to get quickly rich. So, in the end, the funeral is for the user's bank account...